JAMA article sees continuing threat of Iraqi biological warfare

Chicago, Embargoed for release until August 5, 1997, 3 p.m. CT---Iraq continues to pose a threat of biological warfare despite defeat in the Persian Gulf War, according to an article by Raymond A. Zilinskas, Ph.D., in the August 6 issue of The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).

Zilinskas, research associate professor with the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology, University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, was a member of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) investigation team. Together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, UNSCOM has investigated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs since April 1991.

Iraq could quickly resurrect its biological warfare program, Zilinskas warns. "The workforce of more than 200 persons who staffed Iraq's biological warfare program is intact. Iraq's civilian biotechnological infrastructure, comprising more than 80 research, development and production facilities, is whole and well-equipped... It is prudent to assume that the Iraqis retain hidden stores of freeze-dried organisms from its former biological warfare program."

He continues, "Because Iraq maintains these human, biological and industrial resources, it could reconstitute a biological warfare program rapidly and be able to manufacture militarily significant quantities of biological warfare agents within six months."

Iraq today is similar to Iraq before the Gulf War, according to Zilinskas. It has the same leader, Saddam Hussein. It has a large and powerful army and airforce, and it can deploy a large, well-trained civilian workforce. It has the world's third largest oil reserves. Politically, it has the same uneasy, distrustful relations with its neighbors that it had before the war.

Zilinskas suggests, "In consideration of this unsettled situation, it is wise to prepare for the possibility of Iraq's trying once again to gain a dominant position in the Middle East."

Firm enforcement of United Nations resolutions designed to deter Iraq from reacquiring biological warfare capability is essential, he says. Gathering the various treaty compliance regimes under one roof and fostering the flow of communication among them would demonstrate a major lesson learned from the Iraqi experience, namely, the effectiveness of an interdisciplinary approach to limiting future development of weapons of mass destruction.

Zilinskas says Iraq's biological warfare program began in earnest in 1985. By the time the Persian Gulf War ended with a cease-fire in April 1991, Iraq's scientists had investigated the biological warfare potential of five bacterial strains (including anthrax), five viruses, four toxins (including botulinum, the most toxic chemical known to science), and one fungal strain that could be used against crops.

In 1990, Iraq produced 200 biological bombs including 100 filled with botulinum and 50 with anthrax. The biologically armed bombs were deployed at two sites, ready for use. Of greater concern, Zilinskas says, were Iraq's SCUD missiles, some of which were enhanced to double their range. Renamed Al Husseins, 25 of these were fitted with biological warheads containing botulinum, aflatoxin, or anthrax. All reportedly were deployed.

Iraq's biological warfare arsenal was not used during the Gulf War. If it had, Zilinskas says the arsenal probably would have been militarily ineffective -- because it was small, the payload dispersal mechanisms were ineffective, and because the coalition forces had overwhelming air superiority and had crippled Iraq's command and communications network.

After the April 1991 cease-fire, Iraq's biological warfare program personnel reportedly were ordered to destroy all biological warfare agents. But UNSCOM has been unable to verify independently that the destruction took place. UNSCOM also cannot certify that all biological bombs have been destroyed.

Zilinskas asserts that UNSCOM must continue to monitor Iraq's biological research, development, production and testing facilities to guarantee that they are not used once again for biological warfare applications. "As long as UNSCOM is able to continue fulfilling its monitoring responsibilities, Iraq's leadership is likely to be deterred from biological warfare acquisition."

He concludes, "Clearly, UNSCOM must remain fully operational until such time as a leadership is established in Iraq which poses no threat to its neighbors."